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State Sovereignty as Social Construct: 
A case study of Kosovo’s pursuit of independence 
 
Introduction 
Kosovo, a province with its capital in Pristina within Serbia, was placed under UN administration 
after the Kosovo War in 1999 and still struggles for full independence negotiating about its final 
status with Serbia, whose administrative capital is in Belgrade. A decision on the future of the 
province was set for 10 December 2007 but, since a UN negotiating team could not bring Pristina 
and Belgrade to a consensus, the status of Kosovo remains unresolved.1 However, the US and its 
European allies are widely expected to support a unilateral declaration of independence from 
Serbia by the Kosovar leadership after 10 December even in the absence of a new UN resolution 
or a diplomatic breakthrough by the troika.2 On the other hand, Russia, a key ally of Serbia, is in 
a position of ongoing support for Serbia. Russian Ambassador to London, Yury Fedotov, has 
commented that the negotiation process between Belgrade and Pristina should continue until a 
settlement is reached without any artificial deadlines imposed, and warned that the outcome of an 
independent Kosovo would not only violate the principle of territorial integrity but also the 
legitimacy of international law and the authority of the international system.3 This leads us to 
address renewed questions about the location of state sovereignty in international relations. The 
concept of sovereignty tends to be viewed as a static, fixed concept and an absolute principle.4 
However, the constructivist school of thought, which emerged in international relations theory in 
the aftermath of the Cold War, asserted that state sovereignty is socially constructed, as is the 
modern state system.5  
 
This paper will explore state sovereignty as a social construct and look at the case of Kosovo’s 
pursuit of independence. First, it will look at the fundamental nature of sovereignty and its 
changing content across time and space. The fundamental norm of Westphalian sovereignty 
stresses the principle of non-intervention. The principle of self-determination became the new 
rule of the sovereignty game after 1945 and is renewed by recent ethnic groups’ claims for 
sovereignty. Meanwhile, the creation of the UN international system has established new 
international order. In the post-Cold War period, humanitarian intervention emerged from state 
failure to assure the meeting of humanitarian concerns and international peace and security. 
Nowadays, human rights regimes are becoming a universal norm and constitute the legitimate 
source of sovereignty. Next, this paper will explore the concept of state sovereignty as social 
construct and its diversity in different historical contexts. Constructivism emphasizes normative 
and ideational structures in shaping the social identity of the agent, and agent and structure are 
mutually constituted. Sovereignty as an institutionalized norm is constructed by all independent 
states and shapes the identity of the state as ‘sovereign’. However, this paper will argue that 
although normative structures shape political behavior, the meaning of norms and practices 
changes when ideas change; and state practices of great powers dominate the ideational structures. 
As state sovereignty assures non-intervention and political entity as having equal status in the 
international system, Kosovar Albanians seek to be sovereign actors to guarantee their security. 
To be recognized, a state should meet the criteria for a state and be recognized by the 
international community.  
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Therefore, the international community will play an important role in Kosovo’s road to 
independence. In the case study, we will examine the four important aspects of state sovereignty: 
authority, territory, population and recognition in Kosovo and their implications in the process of 
constructing Kosovo’s independence. Finally, it will discuss the possibility of the future status of 
Kosovo based on the new notion and state practice of the sovereignty game. The negotiations 
about the future of Kosovo’s status will reflect how states’ practices and the international 
community respond to ethnic sovereignty. 
 
The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty 
After the Thirty Years’ War, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 developed the modern system of 
sovereign states and established a new ‘international’ legal order for European states.6 The 
fundamental norm of Westphalian sovereignty is “political organization based on the exclusion of 
external actors from authority structures within a given territory”.7 Therefore, Brian Hehir 
observed that “in the Westphalian order both state sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention 
are treated as absolute norms”.8 Traditional understanding of sovereignty is ‘supreme authority 
within a territory’ – the legitimate authority over territory and population.9 F. H. Hinsley defined 
sovereignty as when “there is a final and absolute political authority in a political community” 
and “no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere”.10 Furthermore, it might be understood in 
two dimensions: internal and external. Internal sovereignty refers to the right and the ability of a 
state’s government to exercise control over domestic affairs within a given territory without 
outside interference, and hence this type of sovereignty is also called ‘empirical’ sovereignty11 or 
in Stephen D. Krasner’s definition, ‘domestic sovereignty’12; external sovereignty refers to a 
state’s legal identity in international law and equal status with all other states which stresses 
inviolation of territorial integrity and the state’s political independence from outside authorities, 
being free to conduct foreign relations and hence this type of sovereignty is also called ‘juridical’ 
sovereignty13 or ‘international legal sovereignty’14. States have remained the chief holder of 
external sovereignty since the system of sovereign states15 and are considered as the dominant 
actor in international relations. Thus, the state is regarded as “a legal person or citizen of 
international society”16 only when it acquires sovereignty and is recognized internationally by 
other equal entities. For that reason, sovereignty is portrayed as “a ticket of general admission to 
the international arena”17 allowing the state to enter into international agreements and diplomacy 
and to obey and respect universal norms and rules.  
 
After the Second World War, the principle of ‘self-determination’ emerged as the new sovereignty 
game.18 The notion of self-determination, namely the popular sovereignty, could be generally 
interpreted as the right of individuals and people to choose their own fate and conditions of life, 
and determine their future. It has two dimensions: an internal one, revealing that the people – the 
citizens – are the holder of state sovereignty within the political community, and under this 
circumstance the political form of government should be based on democratic principles; and an 
external one, demonstrating that the community is a distinct political entity and interacts with 
other political entities.19 The principle of self-determination was first applied at the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference according to Fourteen Points by the United States President Woodrow Wilson 
and employed effectively in the decolonization movement after 1945 as many colonial entities in 
Africa and Asia acquired sovereignty and were transformed legally into states.  
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The right of people to self-determination is further introduced into the framework of international 
law and diplomacy, for instance, enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter and culminated 
with the adoption by the 1960 UN’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (General Assembly Resolution 1514).20 Consequently, the system of 
sovereign states has become the global norm after colonial independence around the 1960s.21 
The UN international system replaced the Westphalian system to ensure “political independence 
and territorial integrity” and non-intervention was enshrined in the UN Charter and established 
new international order.22 Today, there are 192 territorially defined sovereign units in the UN as 
Member States.23 Nevertheless, Robert H. Jackson argued that ex-colonies’ claims for sovereign 
statehood have established the ‘negative sovereignty’ regime.24 In Jackson’s definition, ‘negative 
sovereignty’ refers to the right of internal authority to conduct its internal affairs without external 
interference, it could be understood in a formal-legal condition; while ‘positive sovereignty’ 
refers to the capacities of internal authority to act in the world and “provide political goods for its 
citizens”, it is a political rather than a legal status.25 Many former colonies’ governments have 
been criticized for having inadequate capacity to use their sovereign rights, no positive 
socioeconomic provision and neglecting the human rights of the local population. This resulted in 
unstable and illiberal regimes in the newly independent countries and led to the emergence of 
‘quasi-states’ which acquire an internationally guaranteed independence but not ‘positive 
sovereignty’.26 Thus, the new challenge the colonial independence movement presented was that 
state sovereignty cannot only be treated as a rule against outside interference; the state should be 
carried with responsibility to account for providing the basic needs of the people within the 
territory and ensuring international order.27  
 
In the post-Cold War period, interventions and sanctions by the international community have 
challenged the absoluteness of sovereignty, such as military interventions concerned with 
humanitarian objectives by the UN, stretching from Iraq to Bosnia, Somalia to Haiti, and Kosovo 
to East Timor.28 Intervention is a controversial concept to state sovereignty, as R. J. Vincent 
defined it:  
 
Activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international 
organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a discrete 
event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state. 
It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of international 
relations.29   
 
Moreover, Cynthia Weber stated that “when state practices do not fit supposed intersubjective 
norms of what a sovereign state must be, then intervention by a sovereign state into the affairs of 
an ‘aberrant’ state is deemed to be legitimate by a supposed international community”,30 and 
hence the interpretation of intervention can change over time as long as the rules of 
non-intervention change, and rely on a supposed international community for how to interpret 
these norms.31  
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In contemporary international politics, the development of ‘state failure’, ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ and ‘international peace and security maintenance’ have been linked to the modern 
definition of intervention. State failure refers to states being “unable to provide basic social, 
economic, legal, and political services and safeguards to the populations”; in other words, when a 
state “no longer performs the functions normally attributed to it” and consequently is, “no longer 
a source of identity and social meanings”. 32  Although for a long time the principle of 
non-intervention in state sovereignty has been emphasized as the basis for order in the society of 
states, when state failure occurs and leads to collapse into internal war devastating the basic 
human rights of a population, it forms the authority boundary between domestic jurisdiction of 
states over individuals within its territory and international jurisdiction over inalienable human 
rights, raising the question: which authority is superior?33 Since sovereign authority in a failed 
state has collapsed, does it still have the right to exclusive domestic jurisdiction? Furthermore, its 
international legal sovereignty is questionable since it has been recognized as a ‘failed’ state. 
Perhaps this issue enhances the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. However, despite its 
humanitarian objectives, humanitarian intervention is considered as a moral imperative promoted 
by Western democracies; and after all, “sovereign rights still have priority over human rights in 
international law”.34 For example, The Independent International Commission on Kosovo stated 
that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s military intervention in Kosovo was 
“illegal but legitimate”.35 It is likely to say that this long-standing controversy stems not only 
from legal and legitimate issues but also, most importantly, from whose right it is to authorize 
it.36 Apparently, the debate was because NATO is a trans-Atlantic military organization while the 
UN Security Council was unable to act because of Russia and China veto authorizing the use of 
force. Therefore, the argument is not only the tension between non-intervention and universal 
human rights but also the difference of interpretation between international communities in when, 
how, and under what conditions that sovereignty is violated and intervention must be taken. On 
the other hand, the rising ethnic or religious minority groups within a particular geographic area 
pursuing independence to escape from prejudice or persecution by a majority has challenged the 
principle between self-determination and territorial integrity in post-Cold War times.37 The 
difference between decolonization and ethnic self-determination is that decolonization could 
accept colonial frontiers as national borders38 while ethnic groups’ claims to sovereign statehood 
mean that they have to come out of the territory of established states and would bring about 
significant changes in existing borders. 39  It seems that the right of ethnic minorities to 
self-determination is not generally promoted in the early twenty-first century since the notion of 
“people” entitled to self-determination is defined as “persons living in a particular geographic 
area within a nation-state rather than persons sharing a common culture or language”.40 However, 
internal wars resulting from ethnic conflicts such as Kurds in Iraq, Chechens in Russia and 
Kosovar Albanians in Serbia have presented dangers to international security and cause 
humanitarian crisis. 
 
Nowadays, the protection of human rights is becoming the new agenda related to sovereignty in 
international politics. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the core human 
rights law adopted by the UN in 1948. Subsequently, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entered into 
force in 1976, and Article 1 states that “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
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of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development”.41 Kurt Mills demonstrated that “individuals have human rights, 
which must be upheld by any entity claiming sovereignty” and “the authority of a state is derived 
from the popular sovereignty of the people”; and hence human rights and popular sovereignty are 
viewed as constitutive principles of state legitimacy.42 He further stated that: 
 
Theoretically, states exist for the well-being of their inhabitants. The primary function of states is 
that of protection. In other words, the state exists to ensure that its citizens are able to live their 
lives free from the fear that an outside force will interrupt their lives. A reasonable extension of 
this would be that the inhabitants of a state should also be as free from internal persecution as 
from external persecution. Thus, the social function of states is to ensure the ability of people to 
live.43 
 
In sum, states are considered as “instruments at the service of their peoples”.44 The implication 
of sovereignty is the ability of a sovereign state to protect individual human rights within its 
territory and human rights has been broadly defined as a feature of the constitution of legitimate 
sovereignty. Therefore, it suggests that human rights are the base of legitimacy as a new element 
in the nature of sovereignty.45 It has been affirmed in the Helsinki Final Act by the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1975 and in the Copenhagen criteria for entry 
into the European Union (EU) in 1993. It is also becoming a significant part of foreign policy 
discourse, especially in the practice of dominant great powers after the Cold War. On the other 
hand, it is important to note that human rights and popular sovereignty are based on liberal 
democracy derived from Western values. It claims that liberal states are more internally and 
externally stable than illiberal regimes and hardly go to war with one another, which is called 
‘democratic peace’. However, it has been challenged by ‘Asian Values’ which argued that 
Western notions of human rights are seen as another form of cultural imperialism. 
 
State Sovereignty as Social Construct 
Following systemic transformation in the aftermath of the Cold War, the  constructivist school of 
thought emerged in international relations theory and asserted that the role of ideas in shaping the 
international system, and hence international phenomenon is socially constructed and systemic 
change is transformed by practices. Constructivism emphasizes how norms shape behavior: the 
impact of normative and ideational structures on actors’ identities, the role of identity in shaping 
political action, the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures, the role of 
practices in maintaining and transforming those structures, and at the same time, assuming that 
institutionalized norms and ideas have moral force in a given social context. In sum, 
constructivists assert that “the social identities of states are thought to be constituted by the 
normative and ideational structures of international society and those structures are seen as the 
product of state practices”;46 furthermore, “if ideas, norms, and practices matter, and if they 
differ from one social context to another, then history in turn matters”.47 Thomas J. Biersteker 
and Cynthia Weber have assumed that “state, as an identity or agent, and sovereignty, as an 
institution or discourse, are mutually constitutive and constantly undergoing change and 
transformation. States can be defined in terms of their claims to sovereignty, while sovereignty 
can be defined in terms of the interactions and practices of states”.48 Thus, sovereignty is an 
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institutionalized norm that is constructed by all independent states and shapes the identity of the 
state as ‘sovereign”; while at the same time, as shown above, the fundamental nature of 
sovereignty has changed its content across time and space because of the practices of states. In 
other words, the principle of the sovereignty game is invented by all independent states which are 
characterized by having a stable government ruling with supreme authority within a given 
territory and exercising control over a certain population. States acquire identity as ‘sovereign’ to 
act according to the norms of non-intervention and reciprocity in a social system that they 
construct. Also, the principle of non-intervention guarantees the security of states; in particular 
weaker states can survive without possessing powerful military capacities by mutual recognition 
from others, and in the meantime, forms world political order. Biersteker and Weber further 
demonstrated that “sovereignty provides the basis in international law for claims for state actions, 
and its violation is routinely invoked as a justification for the use of force in international 
relations. Sovereignty, therefore, is an inherently social concept”.49 States interact within social 
relations between sovereign states based on social acts of recognition and mutual obligations 
between states. 50  Therefore, sovereignty is an institutionalized norm on the basis of 
intersubjective understandings and expectations. Georg Sørensen has assumed that there are two 
different kinds of rules in the sovereignty game: constitutive rules, which remain unchanged and 
regulative rules, which have changed in several ways.51 The constitutive rules of sovereignty 
including the indispensable elements: territory, people, and government define the core features 
of what sovereignty is; while the regulative rules of sovereignty result from the interaction and 
practices of the antecedently existing entities that are sovereign states. The ongoing changing 
ideas about the meaning of sovereignty are supposed to relate to changes in sovereignty’s 
regulative rule. For example, international legal sovereignty is based on the practices associated 
with mutual recognition between juridical independent territorial entities; the rule is more 
sociological or cognitive perspective and perception than reality.52  
 
Since the 1648 Peace Westphalia established the modern state system, it was a European game 
played within a European society of sovereign states. The Westphalian sovereignty asserted that 
“external authority structures should be excluded from the territory of a state; sovereign states are 
not only de jure independent, they are also de facto autonomous…Moreover, the government of a 
Westphalian sovereign can determine the character of its own domestic sovereignty, its own 
authoritative institutions.”53 However, when the principle of sovereignty became a global norm 
as a result of colonial independence after 1945, Jackson demonstrated that the emergence of 
‘quasi-states’ has shown their sovereignty is more juridical than empirical in the post-colonial 
game.54 This movement has made it obvious the existence of a hierarchic relationship in the 
global system. As Georg Sørensen stated, “it is clear that the legal equality between modern and 
post-colonial states is not matched by substantial equality; post-colonial states are much weaker 
players”.55 The new practices of intervention and sanction in weak or failed states in the 
post-Cold War period demonstrates that these states are unable to react against threats from the 
outside and are dependent upon the international community to provide the security guarantee of 
non-intervention. They are also used to alter the domestic political practices of weaker states to 
favor the stronger states, for instance, the United States’s coercive action insisting on changing 
the regime in Iraq. David A. Lake argued that “the norm of juridical or international legal 
sovereignty has taken such deep roots that it is unseemly or impolite to point out and talk about 
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hierarchies in contemporary international relations”; nevertheless, as we have seen, “hierarchy is 
still there, lying in the middle of the table”.56 However, it is not anarchy in Hobbersian state of 
nature because it is normative conception that makes us know who the violator of the sovereignty 
game is. 
 
As noted above, the regulative rules of the sovereignty game are dynamic contents and have 
changed over time. Biersteker and Weber pointed out “as the prescriptions for sovereign 
recognition change, so does the meaning of sovereignty”; the states as agents or identities are 
never “the product of any one institution or discourse, their meanings arise out of interaction with 
other states and with the international society they form”.57 Furthermore, Alexander Wendt 
suggested that “regular practices produce mutually constituting sovereign identities (agents) and 
their associated institutional norms (structures)”.58 Thus, states’ identity as sovereign is only 
meaningful when states recognize the rules and act on those norms, in the meantime interacting 
with other states within the international society they form. It has been proved by historical 
illustrations that the evolution and substantive meaning of sovereignty did change over time 
through states’ practices. Thanks to the contribution of the Fourteen Points by President Woodrow 
Wilson of the United States at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and subsequently documented 
in the Treaty of Versailles, the doctrine of popular sovereignty which demonstrated that nations 
have a right to self-determination and people are the holders of territorial sovereignty re-emerged 
in international recognition practice. At the same time, the issue of protection of religious and 
ethnic minorities was also regarded as a condition for international legal recognition, particularly 
in the Balkans region. However, it was not until the colonial independence movement around the 
1960s that the principle of self-determination was practically applied in states’ practices.  
 
In the post-Cold War period, new practices of humanitarian intervention in weak or failed states 
have violated norms of non-intervention and showed evidence that “sovereignty is no longer 
sacrosanct”59. Christian Reus-Smit asserted that the social identity of the state as sovereign 
possesses moral purposes to do rightful state action within societies of states.60 And international 
understandings of what constitutes legitimate sovereignty have shifted from norms of territorial 
legitimation to human rights legitimation which concentrates on the relationship between the state 
and its individual citizens. Meanwhile, following the end of the Cold War the victory of the 
Western liberal democracy has made democratic values emerge in international normative 
structure. Although these new norms have been criticized as a form of cultural imperialism which 
imposes Western values on the international arena, J. Samuel Barkin argued that all international 
normative structures can be interpreted as having a strong culturally imperialist element in a 
broader historical view.61 To sum up, the attached meanings to sovereignty vary according to the 
changing ideas. States’ practices in intervention, minority rights, human rights and democracy to 
secure recognition, international legal sovereignty have compromised Westphalian sovereignty.62 
For that reason, Krasner characterized the sovereignty game as ‘organized hypocrisy’. 63 
Moreover, it seems that “the conception of legitimacy and sovereignty of the existing powerful 
states in international relations that become the international norm”,64 as we shall see, since the 
establishment of the Westphalian system of sovereign states in Europe, recognition of new states 
has reflected the interests of the great European powers; and when the United States emerged as 
the dominant power after the Second World War, the practice of national self-determination in 
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decolonization has been supported from American values; as the changing configuration of power 
after the end of the Cold War, international discourse in liberal democracy and human rights 
regimes represents the ideas of the only superpower, the United States. Consequently, “the 
powerful are sometimes in a position to impose their ideas of legitimacy on the less powerful, and, 
therefore, it is the ideas of most powerful states that matter”.65 As Wendt describes ‘anarchy is 
what states make of it’66 and it is likely to say that ‘the rules of game’ is ‘what the states of great 
powers make of it’. 
 
Since the concept of sovereignty is defined as “the absolute authority a state holds over a territory 
and people as well as independence internationally and recognition by other sovereign states as a 
sovereign state”; 67  therefore, authority, territory, population and recognition are important 
aspects of state sovereignty. As Biersteker and Weber contended that each component of state 
sovereignty is socially constructed,68 we will look at each component respectively by analyzing 
the case of Kosovo’s pursuit of independence. 
 
Kosovo: an autonomous province of Serbia or quasi-state? 
Authority 
Kosovar Albanians as a minority ethnic group were granted an autonomous province under the 
rule of 1974 Yugoslav Constitution by Josef Tito’s government until nationalist President 
Slobodan Milosevic revoked its status in 1989. Kosovar Albanians have responded to demand 
independence to secede from the FRY. The aggressive action against Serbian forces by the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and ethnic cleansing against Kosovar Albanians by Serbian 
forces resulted in internal armed conflict in Kosovo between February 1998 and March 1999.69 
Considering mass human suffering in the Kosovo conflict and regardless of the veto of China and 
Russia in the UN Security Council in authorizing forcible action, NATO launched its bombing of 
Yugoslavia in March 1999 and ended the Kosovo war in June 1999. Since Serbian forces were 
driven out and replaced by the Kosovo Force (KFOR), NATO-led peacekeeping forces; Kosovo 
has been placed under the authority of United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) which is pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR1244) on 10 
June , 1999. UNSCR 1244 committed to preserve territorial integrity of the FRY; while at the 
same time beginning the long process of building peace, democracy, stability and 
self-government in Kosovo. UNMIK divides into “four pillars”:  
 
Pillar I: Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the United Nations. 
Pillar II: Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the United Nations. 
Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU).70 
 
The head of UNMIK is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Kosovo 
and he is responsible for the work of the pillars and facilitates the political process to determine 
Kosovo’s future status. Mr. Joachim Rucker of Germany is current Special Representative and 
Head of the UNMIK since 1 September 2006. According to the new Constitutional Framework 
which was adopted in May 2001, responsibilities will be gradually transferred to Provisional 
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Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) which is located in Pristina, through parliamentary 
democracy, enhance democratic governance and respect for the rule of law. The PISG includes: (a) 
Assembly; (b) President of Kosovo; (c) Government; (d) Courts; and (e) Other bodies and 
institutions set forth in this Constitutional Framework. The President of Kosovo, elected by the 
Assembly, is responsible for the unity of the people and guarantees the democratic functioning of 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Mr. Ibrahim Rugova was the first post-war 
president until his death in January 2006; his successor is Mr. Fatmir Sejdiu. Article 1 (2) and 1 (4) 
of the Constitutional Framework separately state that “Kosovo is an undivided territory 
throughout which the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government shall exercise their 
responsibilities” and “Kosovo shall be governed democratically through legislative, executive, 
and judicial bodies and institutions in accordance with this Constitutional Framework and 
UNSCR 1244(1999)”.71   
 
Kosovo is still legally a province of Serbia; however, political, economic and institutional 
operation under UNMIK has made Kosovo separate from the rest of the country.72  The 
engagement of institution-building mechanisms by the international community seeks to establish 
the capability of self-government and restore the legitimacy of authority in Kosovo. But there 
exists an ambiguous authority relationship between the UN, PISG and the Serbian government. It 
is important to note that the Serbian government was never involved in the institution-building 
process in Kosovo. Also, the self-government in Kosovo created by UNMIK is a democratic 
political entity whose current state practices in constructing the authority of a government 
emphasize the will of the people as the final source of legitimacy for the state. 
 
Territory 
Kosovo was the centre of the Serbian empire and generally regarded as the ‘cradle of the Serbs’, 
a Serb heartland, in medieval times. Since the medieval Serbian empire was defeated at the great 
battle of Kosovo in 1389, the region was placed under the Muslim Ottoman Empire. Kosovo’s 
territory has been initially formed since under the Ottoman Empire’s rule. During the First Balkan 
War in 1912-3, Kosovo was mainly absorbed by Serbia again. After the Second World War, 
Serbia remained exercising authority within Kosovo’s territory until Kosovo was granted 
autonomous status and exercised complete control over its territory under Tito’s government. 
After the Kosovo conflict of 1999, Kosovo gained certain levels of self-governance under 
UNMIK and Serbia has had no authority over Kosovo’s territory since then. There are at least 
four controversial concepts of the nation as a right to territory in the Balkans region. The 
historicist principle demonstrates that a people who link their common identity claim to a nation 
have the right to govern their historical lands. Both Serbia and the Albanian population in Kosovo 
assume Kosovo as their historical lands reflected in this concept. The democratic principle states 
that all residents on a particular territory have the right to proceed by popular referendum to 
determine their state. The Helsinki (and UN) principle asserts that all existing borders which 
defines internationally recognized states are ‘inviolable’; while the realist principle claims to use 
military force to acquire physical control despite its illegitimate authority. As far as Kosovo’s 
territorial border is concerned, Susan L. Woodward suggested that it is probably to combine the 
Helsinki principle - Kosovo’s borders as a separate “federal unit” (a province, though not a 
republic) and grant international defense of internal borders, and the democratic principle of 
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self-determination by referendum. But in reality, the European position was ambiguous because 
the EU tended to accept the historicist principle that Kosovo was Serbian territory while at the 
same time conflicted with the realm of human rights of the Albanian position in Kosovo.73  
 
Regarding the hostile disputes over borders between Belgrade and Pristina and the prohibition of 
“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” 
under Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, Korab R. Sejdiu has asserted the principle of uti possidetis 
juris which applied in South and Central America to resolve the former colonial border issues is 
inappropriate to Kosovo’s situation because Serbia still claims its territorial sovereignty over 
Kosovo. He suggested that it is probably appropriate to adopt the oldest principles of 
international law - uti possidetis de facto in this case since it “defines borders based on who 
possesses them after hostilities cease irrespective of the legal definition of former colonial 
borders, Kosovars are now in charge of Kosova’s territory and Serbs have no control therein”.74 
The UN system demonstrates that “territorial entities that have not achieved independence are 
entitled to claim the right to self-determination and achieve sovereign statehood”. 75  The 
Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) developed the rights of persons as “collective 
rights” which belong to national minorities are allowed to “establish and maintain unimpeded 
contacts among themselves within their country as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens 
of other States with whom they share a common ethnic or national origin, cultural heritage, or 
religious beliefs.”76 Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia claimed the inalienable right to national 
self-determination to acquire sovereignty in the 1990s. They were republics of the SFRY based 
on territorial units to exercise self-determination and acquired boundaries according to the 
principle within context of decolonization which illustrated that “the former boundaries acquire 
the character of boundaries protected by international law”. 77  Their difference from 
decolonization was their declarations of independence within the context of the right to 
self-determination by an ethnic, religious, or linguistic group. In the case of Kosovo, the principle 
of self-determination might be applied in an ethnic-national group to express their individual 
human rights, but it is not the right to form a state, it is the right to claim political and cultural 
status, for example, operable levels of autonomy or self-governance within the boundaries of a 
state. Moreover, the dispute over boundaries between Kosovo and Serbia is that Kosovo is a 
province of Serbia while Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia are constituent republics based on 
territorial jurisdiction.  
 
Population  
According to the report on Kosovo in November 2007, the population of Kosovo approximately 
composed of 90% Albanians, 6% Serbs and 4% other minorities (incl. Bosniaks, Goranis, Roma, 
Ashkali, Egyptians, Turks). 78  Kosovo as the Albanian-inhabited region and “autonomous 
province” of the former Yugoslavia consists of a majority Muslim population which distinguishes 
it from Serbian populations, as the majority in Serbia is dominated by the Orthodox Church in a 
cultural and national-political dimension. The different roots, cultural and religious alignments, 
and regional varieties caused Serb-Albanian relations to enter into a series of bloody encounters 
in the historical record.79 As a result of ethnic cleansing by the Serbian government, Kosovar 
Albanians claimed to be sovereign actor to guarantee their security.80 The experience of ethnic 
oppression was reinforced to construct ethnic identity in Kosovo.  
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While a nation consists of “a named human population sharing a historical territory, common 
memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public culture, a common economy and 
territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members of the collectivity”;81 
‘ethnic’ is regarded as “a group of people that share a distinct racial, national, religious, linguistic 
or cultural heritage, including shared history and perceptions, group identity and shared memory 
of past glories and traumas”.82 Identities are shaped by shared experiences, memories and myths, 
and there is no identity without opposition to the identities of significant others. Hurst Hannum 
illustrated that the minority ethnic group might be driven to reinforce their own ethnic identity if 
the dominant ethnic group as majority in a state fail to treat them with non-discrimination and 
equality.83  
 
Therefore, Oliver P. Richmond argued that “ethnic groups view sovereignty as providing their 
best prospects” and “the general logic is that in the contemporary international system, all 
sovereign actors are perceived to have greater levels of security than non-sovereign actors”.84 He 
described that “states assume their claims to sovereignty are sacrosanct, seek to protect and 
promote their unity and cohesion, while ethnic groups seek to reproduce the logic of the national 
state to gain security, welfare, and legitimacy”.85 Sovereignty comes to redefine their identity, 
security, territory and legitimacy, and as a result, ethnic sovereignty emerges. Ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo by the Serbian government in 1999 showed that the state failed to provide security and 
protection for its peoples and thus made Kosovar Albanians strengthen the hope of acquiring 
international status. Kurt Mills argued that there is no distinct definition between a minority and a 
community which is entitled to self-determination. That minorities as distinct communities have a 
moral right to self-determination is perhaps based on political purposes. As one comment about 
Slobodan Milosevic in 1992 stated: 
 
It’s all a tragic absurdity. In fighting for Serbs in Croatia, and now in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
[he] says that all Serbs have the right to live in a single Serbian state. But here in Kosovo, where 
Albanians would like to claim that right for themselves, we are told that we are not a nation, we 
are a minority. It’s simply a matter of double standards.86  
 
The UN Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP) notes that the society created in Kosovo 
should be that all people can “participate fully in the economic, political and social life, [without] 
threats to their security [or] well-being based on ethnicity”, use their own language and “enjoy 
unimpeded access to public places and services”; in addition, persons in the refugees should be 
able to return home “in safety and dignity”.87 It could be said that ethnic community provides an 
environment to practise the fulfillment of human rights and define various ‘selves’. As Moynihan 
illustrated that the “question of sorting out such values [democracy and human rights] in the 
context of ethnic group demands in which people define whom they love by whom they hate”.88 
However, Krasner mentioned that minority rights regimes and human rights regimes are likely to 
be inconsistent with the Westphalian model because they can be subject to external monitoring 
and even enforcement.89 
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Recognition  
Kosovar Albanians regard the acquisition of sovereignty as locating their identity to gain security. 
Recent state practices in sovereign recognition focus on if a new state has territorial basis, a 
democratic government and respect human rights. The Copenhagen European Council in 1993 set 
up the Copenhagen criteria for Central and Eastern Europe which specified EU membership 
conditions: the fulfillment of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, respect 
for and protection of minority and human rights, a functioning market economy and adopting the 
EU law and regulations known as the acquis communautaire.90 Likewise, the preconditions for 
the United States to recognize former Soviet and Yugoslav republics were these new regimes and 
that states adopt democratic constitutions and legal protection for ethnic minorities.91 Similarly, 
the Standards for Kosovo, agreed between PISG and UNMIK and approved by the UN Security 
Council, was launched on 10 December 2003, calling for Kosovo to follow functioning 
democratic institutions and have rule of law, freedom of movement, a functioning market 
economy, dialogue with Belgrade and the Kosovo Protection Corps operating within its agreed 
mandate and the law, and sustainable multi-ethnicity communities in which all individuals, 
regardless of ethnic background, can travel and work safely. These standards have reflected 
Kosovo’s parallel progress towards European Standards in the framework of the EU’s 
Stabilisation and Association Process based inter alia on the Copenhagen criteria. In November 
2003, the UN Security Council regarded the implementation of these Standards as the precursor 
for any talks or negotiations about Kosovo’s final status.92  
 
International negotiations began in 2006 to determine the future status of Kosovo, whether it 
would become independent or remain part of Serbia. The process is led by UN Special Envoy 
Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland (1994-2000), and his office – the UN Office of the 
Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) – is located in Vienna, Austria.93 At the talks led by the 
UN mission in 2003, Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova affirmed that “My country, Kosovo, 
wants to become a part of the European Union and NATO….. This means a democratic, peaceful 
and independent Kosovo”;94 whereas Serbia has made it clear that Kosovo is a constituent part of 
the country and cannot allow the province to separate from Serbian territorial sovereignty. 
Serbian Prime Minister Volislav Kostunica commented in December 2006: “Serbia is much surer 
that its integrity will be preserved and that Kosovo will remain in Serbia, with an appropriate, 
substantial autonomy’.95 On July 24, 2006, Ahtisaari held the first high-level meeting between a 
Belgrade delegation, led by Serbian President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Volislav Kostunica 
and Pristina’s Team of Unity, led by Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu and Prime Minister Agim 
Ceku to discuss Kosovo's future status in Vienna. However, there were no breakthroughs for 
Kosovo's future status and Ahtisaari commented: “it is evident that the positions of the parties 
remain far apart: Belgrade would agree to almost anything but independence, whereas Pristina 
would accept nothing but full independence.”96 At the same time, Ahtisaari also meets regularly 
with representatives of the Contact Group, composed of the United States, United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, that has managed Kosovo affairs since 1999. On September 
20, 2006, Ahtisaari, together with Contact Group foreign ministers, the EU High Representative, 
the EU Presidency, and the European Commissioner for Enlargement, the NATO Secretary 
General and the UN SRSG for Kosovo met in New York to discuss the future status of Kosovo. 
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At that meeting, Ministers called for Kosovo’s PISG and leaders of all of Kosovo’s communities 
to accelerate the implementation of UN-endorsed Standards, promote reconciliation and develop 
trust among ethnic communities.97 On 2 February 2007, Ahtisaari presented a draft status 
settlement proposal to Belgrade and Pristina, just after Serbia held parliamentary elections on 21 
January, 2007. He stated that the proposal was the result of one year of intensive negotiations 
with the parties. “In the course of 2006, UNOSEK held 15 rounds of direct talks between 
Belgrade and Pristina negotiating teams, and our experts visited Belgrade and Pristina twenty six 
times to talk separately to the parties on various.”98 The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement was officially delivered to the UN Security Council on 26 March; it 
recommended that “Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the international 
community”. It also stressed that “Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle 
to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic 
reconciliation” and “delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks challenging not only its own 
stability but the peace and stability of the region as a whole.”99  
 
However, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica stated that the proposal was “unacceptable 
and illegitimate for Serbia” since Ahtisaari’s proposal would redraw Serbia’s internationally 
recognised borders and result in snatching away 15% of Serbia’s territory and violate the 
principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, which is guaranteed by the 
UN Charter.100 In the meantime, Russia indicated that a UN resolution paving the way for 
Kosovo’s independence from Serbia would not get through the Security Council if it was 
unacceptable to Serbia.101 Therefore, as a Statement issued on 20 July 2007, by Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, UK and the USA, co-sponsors of the draft resolution on Kosovo presented to the 
UNSC on 17 July, showed that “we regret, however, that it has been impossible to secure such a 
resolution in the UNSC”.102 The co-sponsors announced that further UN discussions on the 
matter may be within the Contact Group and with the parties. On 1 August, the 
Secretary-General’s Statement on the New Period of Engagement on Kosovo showed that 
negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade would be held by a troika comprising representatives 
of the EU, the Russian Federation and the US, and the Contact Group would report back by 10 
December.103 Despite Serbian and Russian disapproval, western countries might eventually give 
Pristina a green light to bring independence by some unilateral steps on the basis of the Ahtisaari 
plan.104 Considering long-term contributed troops and money of the Americans and other NATO 
members to Kosovo security in the KFOR mission and regional peace and security in the Balkans, 
the US, Britain and France tend to recognise Kosovar independence “under a novel system of 
EU-supervised sovereignty, no matter what Kosovo’s ethnic Serb minority, Serbia, Greece, 
Russia and the UN may say”; hence, “counting on the trio’s support, Kosovo’s Prime Minister, 
Agim Ceku, insists independence is inevitable by the year’s end”.105 There are at least twenty 
members of the EU likely to join the US to recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by 
the Kosovar Albanians around 10 December, the date when the troika of negotiators is due to 
submit their report to the UN.106 
 
 
Although Serbs regard Kosovo as part of Serbia, Kosovo has been withdrawn from the control of 
the Serbian administrative and legal system since the end of the Kosovo War in June 1999. It 
seems difficult for Kosovar Albanians to agree to return under the authority of Serbia since they 
have experienced autonomous status, ethnic cleansing, the Kosovo War and self-government 
under UNMIK. Whether Kosovo can be granted international status and given the right to 
statehood may rely on its capacity to enter into relations with other states; but Kosovo’s stance in 
diplomatic dimension demonstrates its limited capacity to defend itself, depending on UNMIK 
and KFOR administration. In his report on the future status of Kosovo to the UN 
Secretary-General on 26 March, Ahtisaari has mentioned:  
 
While UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not been able to 
develop a viable economy. Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to access 
international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract the foreign 
capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty and 
unemployment. Unlike many of its western Balkans neighbours, Kosovo is also unable to 
participate effectively in any meaningful process towards the European Union… Kosovo’s weak 
economy is, in short, a source of social and political instability, and its recovery cannot be 
achieved under the status quo of international administration.107 
 
Another concern is Kosovo’s capacity to deal with the protection of minorities. The inter-ethnic 
clashes between Serbian Kosovars and Albanian Kosovars in the town of Mitrovica in northern 
Kosovo in March 2004 led to widespread international condemnation. Serbian Prime Minister 
Vojislav Kostunica described the riots as examples of the violent and terrorist character of 
Albanian separatism and claimed that Kosovo Serbs should be given autonomy.108 This event 
showed that Kosovo should make more effort to guarantee the security of minorities, Serbs. 
Otherwise, it might become another form of ‘quasi-state’. Like many postcolonial states, their 
unreadiness to prepare to take on the burden of governing themselves resulted in their failure.109 
Moreover, although the legal criteria for external recognition of a state’s legitimate domination 
has been through different changes over time, it is apparent that the idea of liberal democracy and 
human rights has dominated recognition practices in the twentieth century for a political entity 
which intends to declare independence to acquire international legal sovereignty. Also, the 
ongoing discourse among the international community on the future status of Kosovo reflects 
hierarchy as the nature of international society, in particular after the UN Special Envoy’s plan 
failed to secure a Security Council resolution and led to the Contact Group, the six Great Powers, 
to dominate the process of negotiations. As Biersteker and Weber stated that “the ideal of state 
sovereignty is a product of the actions of powerful agents and the resistances to those actions by 
those located at the margins of power”,110 it is worth noting that the rule for international 
recognition is based on the ideas and values of the dominant great powers in international society. 
 
Conclusion 
From constructivists’ point of view, sovereignty as an institutionalized norm defines the social 
identities of the states as ‘sovereign’; and because states interact with other states according to the 
norm of sovereignty, sovereignty is defined as the product of state practices; and the rules of the 
game in sovereignty change across time and space through state practices. Thus, sovereignty as a 
social and normative concept conditions the identity of the state. However, when ideas of agents 
change, the meaning attached to sovereignty varies according to the changing ideas; as a result, 
ideas shape state practices and lead to structural transformation. As the concept of sovereignty 
shows in the case of constructing Kosovo’s pursuit of independence, the principle of 
non-intervention which the Westphalian sovereignty stressed has motivated Kosovar Albanians to 
be sovereign actors to guarantee their security. The principle of self-determination which emerged 
in the sovereignty game after 1945 and the institutional process under democratic principles by 
UNMIK and KFOR presents an opportunity for Kosovar Albanians to come out of the territorial 
boundaries of Serbia. However, with human rights as a new agenda emphasized in UN international 
law, Kosovar Albanians as a minority ethnic group might express their individual human rights by 
applying the principle of self-determination, but it is not the right to form a state, it is the right to 
claim political and cultural status. At present, the rights of a minority to self-determination conflicts 
with the principle of territorial integrity which is strengthened in the UN Charter. The right to ethnic 
self-determination as a basis for Kosovoar Albanians to demand independence will violate territorial 
integrity of Serbia and result in changing existing borders of Serbia. Moreover, acquisition of 
sovereignty allows the state to enter into relations with other states. States act in the world by 
mutual recognition and at the same time, establish international order. The criteria for a state to be 
recognized by other political entities have reflected the interests of the great powers. Current state 
practices in sovereign recognition which have showed in the Standards for Kosovo are functioning 
democratic institutions, the rule of law, freedom of movement, a functioning market economy, and a 
human rights regime. The international community regards the implementation of these Standards 
as the precursor for any talks or negotiations about Kosovo’s final status. The future status of 
Kosovo has invited the international community to engage in the negotiating process. After the 
proposal of supervised independence for Kosovo by the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari failed 
to secure a UN resolution, the talks on status settlements have returned to the six dominant great 
powers, the Contact Group. However, they still were unable to bring Belgrade and Pristina to any 
agreement by the deadline, 10 December 2007. Now, the negotiating positions and statements have 
been divided into two sides. As ethnic conflict may pose dangers to individual, state, regional and 
international security, for both humanitarian and security reasons, the US and its European allies 
tend to support a unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovar Albanians. Consequently, it 
seems that the basic foundation of the Westphalian sovereignty – non-intervention – has given way 
to the effort that the international community makes to resolve ethnic conflict, avoid humanitarian 
disasters and maintain international order. Meanwhile, Russia insists that recognizing Kosovo’s 
independence will violate the principle of territorial integrity which is enshrined in the UN Charter. 
Whether humanitarian and security concerns could compromise the rules of the sovereignty game is 
currently witnessed by the practice of the international community on the final status of Kosovo. 
Whether or not Kosovo will be granted independence, the negotiating process on its status 
settlements by the international community has demonstrated that the concept of state sovereignty is 
not static, fixed and absolute but socially constructed.  
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